

# **RPKI at Route Servers**

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# **ROAs - Route Origin Authorisations**

- A cryptographically secure replacement for route[6] objects
- Adds maximum prefix length
- Yields route origin triplets that have been validated

```
( Origin AS, Prefix , Max Length )
( AS65500, 2001:db8::/32, /48 )
( AS65501, 192.0.2.0/24, /24 )
```



## Route Server Refresh at INEX

- RPKI just one element of a complete filtering re-think
- Upgrade configuration from Bird v1.6 to Bird v2.0
- Complete rewrite of filtering workflow
  - Large communities used extensively within the route server
- Upgrade Bird's Eye¹ for Bird v2 BGP
- Overhaul IXP Manager looking glass



# Bird v1 to v2 Changes


- RPKI-RTR supported
- Collapsed separate daemons for IPv4 and IPv6 into a single daemon
  - master route table becomes master4 / master6
  - new protocol blocks: ipv4 { ... } / ipv6 { ... }
- Other very minor configuration changes





# Validating BGP Routing with RPKI-RTR

- A cache server (validator) does the cryptographic heavy lifting
- Routers receive and maintain the set of ROAs via RPKI-RTR from the cache
- RPKI gives three validation results: VALID, INVALID, UNKNOWN





# IXP Manager v5 Route Server Filtering

- 1. Small prefixes (default is > /24 / /48 for ipv4 / ipv6)
- 2. Martians / bogons
- 3. Ensure at least 1 ASN and <= 64 ASNs in path
- 4. Ensure peer AS is the same as first AS in the prefix's AS path
- 5. Prevent next-hop hijacking
- 6. Filter known transit networks
- 7. Ensure origin AS is in set of ASNs from member AS-SET
- 8. RPKI:
  - Valid -> accept
  - Invalid -> drop
- 9. RPKI Unknown -> revert to standard IRRDB prefix filtering



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## **Filter Known Transit Networks**

These do not peer at IX's and they aren't typically customers of IX participants

```
define TRANSIT_ASNS = [ 174,
14
                                                     # Cogent
15
                              203.
                                                     # Qwest (HE carries this on IXPs IPv6 (Jul 12 2018))
                                                     # UUNET
16
                              701.
17
                              702,
                                                     # UUNET
18
                              1239.
                                                     # Sprint
10
                              1299.
                                                     # Telia
28
                              2914.
                                                    # NTT Communications
                              3257.
                                                    # GTT Backbone
21
22
                              3320.
                                                     # Deutsche Telekon AG (DTAG)
                              3356.
                                                     # Level3
23
                              3549,
                                                    # Level3
24
                                                     # Savvis / CenturyLink
25
                              3561,
                                                     # Chinanet
26
                              4134.
27
                              5511.
                                                     # Orange opentransit
                              6453.
                                                     # Tata Communications
28
29
                              6461.
                                                     # Zayo Bandwidth
38
                              6762.
                                                    # Seabone / Telecom Italia
31
                              7018 ];
                                                     # AT&T
```



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# **Ensure Origin AS is in member's AS-SET**

as-set: AS-HEANET

descr: Autonomous Systems routed by HEAnet

members: AS1213, AS2128, AS112, AS42310, AS2850, AS-IEDR

remarks: Group ASs routed by HEAnet together

mnt-by: HEANET-NOC

source: RIPE

No ability to create AS sets in RPKI

draft-ietf-grow-rpki-as-cones under discussion

This is a regression over static IRRDB filtering




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# IXP Manager v5 Bird Topology - Import From Member



43760:1101:\* are filtered

**NEW ROUTE SERVERS** 


# **Route Server BGP Community Usage**

Description	Large Community		
RPKI Valid	43760:1000:1		
RPKI Unknown	43760:1000:2		
IRRDB Valid	43760:1001:1		

Description	Larcommunity
Bogon Prefix	43760:1101:3
IRRDB Invalid	43760:1101:9
RPKI Invalid	43760:1101:13



# IXP Manager v5 Bird Topology - Export To Member



# Side nore

# **Standard IX Route Server Community Filters**

Description	Community	Large Community
Prevent announcement of a prefix to a certain peer	0:peer-as	43760:0:peer-as
Announce a prefix to a certain peer	43760:peer-as	43760:1:peer-as
Prevent announcement of a prefix to all peers	0:43760	43760:0:0
Announce a prefix to a all peers	43760:43760	43760:1:0





**RPKI Implementation Notes** 



**OINFX** 

## RPKI @ INEX

## Validator Software - RIPE NCC RPKI Validator 3

- RIPE NCC RPKI Validator 3 released in 2018
  - https://github.com/RIPE-NCC/rpki-validator-3
- Dramatically reduces installation complexity
- Modest VM requirements, runs on standard OS distributions
- Requirement to download ARIN TAL separately

```
$ wget https://ftp.ripe.net/tools/rpki/validator3/rc/generic/rpki-validator-latest-dist.tar.gz
$ tar zxf rpki-validator-latest-dist.tar.gz
$ ./rpki-validator-3.0-x/rpki-validator-3.sh
$ open http://localhost:8080
```

- \$ wget https://ftp.ripe.net/tools/rpki/validator3/rc/generic/rpki-rtr-server-latest-dist.tar.gz
- \$ tar zxf rpki-rtr-server-latest-dist.tar.gz
- \$ ./rpki-rtr-server/rpki-rtr-server-3.sh



## Validator Software - Routinator

- Routinator by NLnet Labs
  - https://github.com/NLnetLabs/routinator
- First impressions: low overheard, installation simplicity, stable, "just works"
- Requirement to download ARIN TAL separately

```
$ curl https://sh.rustup.rs -sSf | sh
$ source ~/.cargo/env
$ cargo install routinator
$ routinator rtrd -al 127.0.0.1:3323
```



## Validator Software - Cloudflare RPKI Toolkit

- OctoRPKI pulls ROAs from trust anchors and validates their signatures
- GoRTR distributes these ROAs to clients using the RPKI-RTR protocol
- First impressions: low overheard, installation simplicity, stable, "just works"
- Requirement to download ARIN TAL separately

```
$ apt install golang git rsync ca-certificates
$ go get github.com/cloudflare/cfrpki/cmd/octorpki
$ ./go/bin/octorpki -h
$ mkdir tals && mkdir cache && touch rrdp.json
$ cp go/src/github.com/cloudflare/cfrpki/cmd/octorpki/tals/* tals/
```



## Validator Software - RPKI-RTR and Bird

```
roa4 table t roa;
protocol rpki rpki1 {
    roa4 { table t roa; };
    remote "192.0.2.67" port 3323;
    retry keep 90;
    refresh keep 900;
    expire keep 172800;
```



## Validator Software - RPKI-RTR and Bird

```
# RPKI check
rpki_result = roa_check( t_roa, net, bgp_path.last_nonaggregated );
if( rpki_result = ROA_INVALID ) then {
    ...
}
# or ROA VALID / ROA UNKNOWN
```



# **Implementation Process at INEX**

- INEX has two route servers and a route collector per LAN
- Upgrade route collector to Bird v2 + RPKI first
  - identify members who peer on the route server with RPKI invalid prefixes
  - found 4 members of ~80 with issues
    - 1 x more specific advertised than ROA allowed for
    - 1 x origin AS not matching ROA
    - 1 x member still advertising transferred space, new owners had ROAs
    - 1 x member created ROA for upstream peer-as rather than origin-as
  - members alerted to this on a "FYI basis" (i.e. non-blocking for INEX)
- Route server #1 completed Feb 7th
- Route server #2 completed Feb 14th



# **Implementation Process at INEX**

- Outside of the four members with issues, no other member issues
- Single issue relating to Bird v2 with session establishment (known bug, fixed)
- No issues with Routinator
- Issues with RIPE NCC Validator (crashing, disk space)
- RIPE NCC Validator replaced with Cloudflare RPKI toolkit no further issues
- Upgrade was substantial amount of work:
  - Bird v2
  - 24 route collectors and route servers
  - Large community tagging and filtering
  - RPKI vs IRRDB
  - Community engagement





### Looking Glass INEX Cork - Route Collector - IPv4

INEX Cork - Route Collector - IPv4 + Q, #

This is the public looking glace. Uncached results and additional routers available when logged in.

Dird v2 2.0.3 | API: 1.2.0 | Router ID: 105.1.69.126 | Uptime: 11 days. | Last Reconfigure: 2019-02-16 15/12/02 | JSON: [status] [bgp]


Search:

Neighber :	Description	tt. ASN et	Table ::	PfxLimit «	State/PfxRcd ==	PfxExp ==	Actions
185.1.69.6	AS112 - AS112 Reverse DNS	112	master4		2	6	Detail
185.1.69.24	AS714 - Apple Distribution International	714	master4		596	•	fails
185.1.69.26	AS714 - Apple Distribution International	714	master4		597	The second of	Dotails
185.1.69.11	AS1213 - HEAnet	1213	master4		23		Details
185.1.69.12	AS5466 - Eir	5466	master4		77	A Media	Details
105.1.69.17	AS15405 - East Cork Broadband	15405	master4		5	¢	Details
185.1.69.14	AS15171 - Strencon	16171	master4		4	e	Details
185.1.69.16	AS20940 - Akamai Technologies	28946	master4		1	•	Details
185.1.69.73	AS25152 - RIPE NCC K-root server	25152	master4		1		Detail:
185.1.69.10	AS31122 - Viatel	31122	master4		98	4	Details
185.1.69.19	AS41736 - Nova Telecom	41736	master4		3		Details
185.1.69.21	AS42090 - Rapid Broadband	42894	master4		6		Details



Network +.	Next Hop 14	m Metric m	Communities? #	AS Path	11 11
104.132.227.0/24	185.1.69.12	100	1 (12	5466 41264	Details
109.125.0.0/18	185.1.69.12	P 198	1 (: 2	5466 1575	Details
132.189.78.0/24	185.1.69.12	100	2 CES A CESS C	5466 8116	Details
132.189.79.0/24	185.1.69.12	198		5466 8116	Details
132.237.132.0/24	185.1.69.12	100	1 (: 2	5466 30614	Details
132.237.167.0/24	185.1.69.12	P 100	1 (; 2	5466 30614	Details
134.191.192.0/24	185.1.69.12	100	1 (12	5466 4983	Details
134.191.216.0/22	185.1.69.12	P 100	1 (12	5466 4983 4983 4983 4983 4983 4983 4983 4983	Details
134.191.220.0/23	185.1.69.12	198	1 (12	5466 4983 4983 4983 4983 4983 4983 4983 4983	Details
134.191.240.0/22	185.1.69.12	100	1 (c: 3 A	5466 4983	Details
134.191.244.0/24	185.1.69.12	P 100	1 (C) A	5466 4983	Details
134.191.246.0/23	185.1.69.12	108	1 (C: 2	5466 4983	Details
135.74.153.0/24	185.1.69.12	2 100		5466 18676	Details
146.214.64.0/23	185.1.69.12	D 100	1 (CI3 A	5466 42213	Details


**OINEX** 



Network



## New Route Server Filtered Prefixes Tool





### Route Server Filtered Prefixes

Bad news! We found 9 prefix(es) that are currently being filtered.

These are listed below with the reason for the filtering and the route server where filtering has been applied.

Prefix	Filtered Because	Filtered On Router(s)
87.232.5.0/24	IRRDB PREFIX FILTERED	rs1-lan1-lpv4 rs2-lan1-lpv4
87.232.128.0/21	RPKI INVALID	rs1-lan1-ipv4 rs2-lan1-ipv4
87.232.64.0/18	NEXT HOP NOT PEER IP	rs1-lan1-ipv4 rs2-lan1-ipv4
87.232.32.0/19	RPKI INVALID	rs1-lan1-lpv4 rs2-lan1-lpv4
91.197.36.0/22	TRANSIT FREE ASN	rs1-lan1-ipv4 rs2-lan1-ipv4

### **IXP MANAGER**

# IXP Manager v5.1.0 Released

- BIRD2 support for route servers, route collectors, AS112
- RPKI support
- Major looking-glass overhaul, including Prefix Analysis Tool
- Laravel upgrade for latest framework support
- Bootstrap upgrade with new front-end look
- Available on https://github.com/inex/IXP-Manager



THANK YOU

**Questions?** 



